I n 2011, a strain of Klebsiella pneumoniae resistant to multiple antibiotics, including carbapen ems, was identified in the inten sive care unit (ICU) of the Clini cal Center of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) . 1 This organism has since colonized at least 19 patients and may have caused seven deaths among pa tients with severe coexisting con ditions. Although the spread of the organism was traced through clinical epidemiologic investiga tion and wholegenome sequenc ing, it was curtailed by "rigor ous infectioncontrol procedures." What does this episode tell us about how to mitigate the risk of future outbreaks?
The threat of infections due to multidrugresistant organisms (MDROs) is increasing. Methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) has attracted the most attention, but multidrugresistant gramnegative rods (MDRGNRs) are more menacing. No effective drugs are available to treat some lifethreatening MDRGNR infec tions, and there are few new anti microbials in development. Resis tance to cephalosporins is so widespread that many clinicians turn to carbapenems for serious infections, but as their use has increased, so has resistance. The problem is not confined to enteric gram negatives, as physicians faced with treating patients infect ed with acinetobacter, pseudo monas, and other panresistant strains are discovering. Resistance that develops in one corner of the world can spread quickly, as demonstrated by MDRGNRs con taining New Delhi metallobeta lactamase 1.
In the NIH outbreak, molecular epidemiologic investigation pro vided insights into the spread and increasing antibiotic resistance of klebsiella. But the truth is that we already know how MDROs spread. Reliable adherence to basic infection control practices is the key to interrupting transmis sion in our hospitals.
MDROs are transmitted mainly on the hands of caregivers who do not practice effective hand hy giene after every contact with pa tients and their environment. Once hospitals have trained clinical personnel, verified that they know how to use alcoholbased hand rubs and soap and water, and placed full, operating dispensers and sinks where personnel can use them during routine care, any thing less than complete adher ence to handhygiene guidelines constitutes a violation of sound practice and requires accountabil ity. Since some MDROs (especially grampositive bacteria and acinet obacter) can survive for prolonged periods, fastidious cleaning and disinfection are also essential. In the NIH outbreak, klebsiella survived on a ventilator that had been cleaned three times with two different disinfectants. Environ mental services personnel are as much a part of the MDRO contain ment net as doctors and nurses.
Environmental infection control is not the place for hospitals to cut corners when scrutinizing their bottom line.
Most ICU infections -even in severely immunosuppressed pa tients -are attributable to inva sive devices, such as central ve nous catheters, ventilators, and urinary catheters. We know how to prevent these infections; even in patients colonized with MDROs, infection is unlikely if we adhere to established practices. Although progress in reducing harm relat ed to infections in U.S. hospitals has been slow, rates of central line-associated bloodstream infec tions are decreasing through reli able application of evidencebased "bundles" of care practices and decisionsupport checklists, espe cially when combined with strong leadership commitment, team work, communication, peer be havior norms, realtime feedback of adherence data, and account ability.
Overuse of antibiotics pro motes resistance in individual hospitals and contributes to the global emergence and spread of MDROs. Limited progress has been made despite the fact that sound guidance has been avail able for more than 15 years. 2 "Antimicrobial stewardship" -structured guidance and support for responsible selection and utili zation of antimicrobial agentsis gaining traction in the United States and abroad, although evi dence that stewardship programs are having an effect on the devel opment of resistance (as opposed to other outcomes, such as Clos tridium difficile infections, the cost of antibiotics, or the suffering and costs associated with adverse drug events) remains sparse. Be cause reduced antibiotic use should be associated with less resistance, embedding the major tenets of stewardship into routine front line work is essential. Antimicro bial stewardship encompasses a broad array of strategies, 3 but a parsimonious set of interventions aimed at reducing exposure to antibiotics may have the greatest effect on resistance (see table) . The klebsiella that killed pa tients at the NIH was brought in by a patient transferred from a New York City hospital. It took microbiologists 4 weeks to acquire screening media that had been validated for cultures from the rectum -the most important site of colonization for enteric gramnegative organisms. Al though selective media have been developed for identifying organ isms that produce extendedspec trum betalactamases or K. pneu moniae carbapenemase, they have not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration and are not in common use in the United States. We urgently need screen ing media (or realtime genomic tests) that can be deployed quick ly to identify patients who are colonized with MDROs that sur veillance networks have identified as emerging threats. In essence, hospitals should create a cordon sanitaire to identify and isolate patients transferred from other hospitals or chronic care facili ties, especially when they come from communities where specific MDROs are known to be prob lematic. Facilities transferring pa tients should notify the receiving institution about their antibiotic resistance problems.
Customized screening media can also be used for "ring con tainment" should patients be ex posed to other patients who have been colonized. Some have advo cated screening of all patients on admission for certain MDROs, especially MRSA. The costeffec tiveness of this approach remains controversial; screening for only one organism while ignoring other potentially lethal and diffi culttotreat bacteria seems im prudent. The challenge is even more complicated for gram neg atives; it remains unclear which organisms merit isolation precau tions, and there is no validated method whereby colonized pa tients can be "screened off" of precautions. This knowledge gap is especially problematic with re gard to children, for whom ex tended isolation poses unique challenges. Studies focused on the duration of colonization and the effectiveness of targeted screen ing for MDRGNRs are desper ately needed. Incorporating these fundamen tal prevention and control prac tices into the daily life of the hospital is difficult, as demon strated by persistently low rates of adherence even in the coun try's most prestigious institutions. The Department of Health and Human Services and many orga nizations have invested heavily in programs aimed at improving per formance, but hospitals often ap proach each infection individually rather than redesigning frontline systems to facilitate adherence to best practices -for example, in corporating a set of critical prac tices, such as timely removal of in vasive devices and "deescalation" of antibiotic treatment (including narrowing or discontinuing anti biotics once culture results are available), into a bedside check list. Multidisciplinary care path ways can incorporate standing order sets, checklists, and prompts (such as alerts to consider "seda tion vacation" for ventilated pa tients) that can facilitate not only adherence but also realtime data collection and feedback that re inforce social norms. Enhanced data collection can be accom plished through "random audits" 4 that target one key aspect of evi dencebased care at least weekly on rounds, with the team check ing adherence on a simple form at each bedside and sharing a tally and strategies for improve ment at the end of rounds. This data collection should be a seam less part of work, not extra labor performed by someone else.
Even fastidious adherence to evidencebased practice does not guarantee immunity from MDR GNR outbreaks. Although relative ly rare, these outbreaks require ongoing vigilance, rapid epidemi ologic investigation, and prompt response. 5 Commonsource out breaks caused by contaminated solutions or equipment still oc cur despite advances in steriliza tion and disinfection, elimination of multidose containers, and pro cedures designed to minimize contamination during use. New resistant pathogens may emerge suddenly and escape the growing global surveillance network, arriv ing at the hospital door unher alded. But if hospitals develop reliable, evidencebased systems to minimize the MDRO threat, they will be able to refocus on developing innovative approaches to intercepting and mitigating new dangers. I n the 1970s, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) de veloped regulatory pathways for a number of active drug ingredi ents that were on the market but had not been approved by the FDA. Antiseptic drug products fall into one class of drugs that was included in the regulations that resulted from the expert re views of the 1970s. At the time, it was assumed that antiseptic drug products were free of mi crobial contamination because of their pharmacologic activity. The need for sterile manufacture for these products was therefore not considered. In recent years, how ever, there have been published reports linking outbreaks of in fection to antiseptic products that
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